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In 1980, 30 million U.S. workers actively participated in employer-sponsored defined
benefit (DB) retirement savings plans, and 19 million actively participated in employersponsored defined contribution (DC) retirement savings plans. By 2011, participation in DB
plans had nearly halved to 17 million workers, while DC plan participation had skyrocketed to
74 million workers.2 The shift from DB plans, which set contribution levels and investment
allocations on behalf of employees, to DC plans, which allow employees to choose from a
complex array of possible contribution levels and investment allocations, has arrived amidst
concerns that workers are not equipped to make well-informed savings choices (Mitchell and
Lusardi, 2011). Employers have become increasingly interested in programs designed to help
employees make good choices in DC plans. This paper studies such a program.
We use a field experiment to investigate the effect of a peer information intervention on
retirement savings choices. Peer information interventions involve disseminating information
about what a target population’s peers typically do. By sharing this information, it may be
possible to teach people that a certain behavior is more common than they had previously
believed, motivating those people to engage in the behavior more themselves. This approach has
been dubbed “social norms marketing” and is used at approximately half of U.S. colleges in an
effort to reduce student alcohol consumption (Wechsler et al., 2003).
There are several theoretical reasons why peer information interventions may succeed at
moving behavior towards the peer-group average. An individual may mimic peers because their
behavior reflects private information relevant to the individual’s payoffs (Banerjee, 1992;
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993). Another possibility
is that the intervention provides information about social norms from which deviations are costly
due to a taste for conformity, the risk of social sanctions, identity considerations, or strategic
complementarities (Asch, 1951; Festinger, 1954; Akerlof, 1980; Bernheim, 1994; Akerlof and
Kranton, 2000; Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2003; Benjamin, Choi, and Strickland, 2010;
Benjamin, Choi, and Fisher, 2010). Finally, individuals may directly derive utility from relative
consumption (Abel, 1990).
A growing empirical literature documents that peer effects indeed play a role in financial
decisions when peers interact with each other organically. Peers affect retirement saving
2
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1

outcomes (Duflo and Saez, 2002 and 2003), stock market participation (Hong, Kubik, and Stein,
2004; Brown et al., 2008), corporate compensation and merger practices (Bizjak, Lemmon, and
Whitby, 2009; Shue, 2013), entrepreneurial risk-taking (Lerner and Malmendier, 2013), and
general economic attitudes such as risk aversion (Ahern, Duchin, and Shumway, 2013).3 Peer
information interventions such as the one we study are designed to harness the power of these
peer effects to influence behavior.
Many studies find that peer information interventions cause behavior to more closely
conform to the disseminated peer norm.4 Our field experiment, however, yields a surprising
result. Peer information interventions can generate an oppositional reaction: information about
the high savings rates of peers can lead low-saving individuals to shift away from the peer norm
and decrease their savings relative to a control group that did not receive peer information. Our
evidence suggests that this effect is driven in part by peer information causing some individuals
to become discouraged, making them less likely to increase their savings rates.
We conducted our experiment in partnership with a large manufacturing firm and its
retirement savings plan administrator. Employees received different letters depending on their
401(k) enrollment status. Employees who had never participated in the firm’s 401(k) plan were
mailed Quick Enrollment (QE) letters, which allowed them to start contributing 6% of their pay
to the plan with a pre-selected asset allocation by returning a simple reply form. Employees who
had previously enrolled but were contributing less than 6% of their pay received Easy Escalation
(EE) letters, which included a nearly identical reply form that could be returned to increase their
contribution rate to 6%. Previous work has shown that these simplified enrollment and
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Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) review the literature on herding and related phenomena in financial markets. For
evidence of peer effects in other domains, see Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren (1990), Case and Katz (1991), Besley
and Case (1994), Hershey et al. (1994), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996),
Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000), Kallgren, Reno, and Cialdini (2000), Sacerdote (2001), Munshi (2004),
Munshi and Myaux (2006), Sorensen (2006), Gerber, Green, and Larimer (2008), Grinblatt, Keloharju, and
Ikäheimo (2008), Kuhn et al. (2011), Narayanan and Nair (2013), and Chalmers, Johnson, and Reuter (forthcoming).
Manski (2000) provides an overview of issues in the social interaction literature.
4
For example, providing information about peers moves behavior towards the peer norm in domains such as entrée
selections in a restaurant, contributions of movie ratings to an online community, small charitable donations, music
downloads, towel re-use in hotels, taking petrified wood from a national park, and stated intentions to vote (Cai,
Chen, and Fang, 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Frey and Meier, 2004; Salganik, Dodds, and Watts, 2006; Goldstein,
Cialdini, and Griskevicius, 2008; Cialdini et al., 2006; Gerber and Rogers, 2009). However, Beshears et al. (2013)
find that disseminating short printed testimonials from peers is not effective at increasing conversion from brandname prescription drugs to lower-cost therapeutic equivalents.
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contribution escalation mechanisms significantly increase savings plan contributions (Choi,
Laibson, and Madrian, 2009; Beshears et al., 2013).
We assigned the QE and EE mailing recipients to one of three randomly selected
treatments. The mailing for the first randomly selected treatment included information about the
savings behavior of coworkers in the recipient’s five-year age bracket (e.g., employees at the
firm between the ages of 20 and 24, employees between the ages of 25 and 29, etc.). The mailing
for the second randomly selected treatment contained similar information about coworkers in the
recipient’s ten-year age bracket (e.g., employees at the firm between the ages of 20 and 29). The
mailing for the third randomly selected treatment contained no peer information and therefore
served as a control condition. For the QE recipients, the two peer information mailings stated the
fraction of employees in the relevant age bracket who were already enrolled in the savings plan.
For the EE recipients, the two peer information mailings stated the fraction of savings plan
participants in the relevant age bracket contributing at least 6% of their pay on a before-tax basis
to the plan.
Employees in our study naturally fall into four subpopulations distinguished along two
dimensions: QE recipients versus EE recipients, and employees who were automatically enrolled
at a 6% contribution rate unless they opted out (non-union workers at this firm) versus
employees who were not enrolled unless they opted into the plan (union workers at this firm).
Table I summarizes the key features of these four subpopulations. We distinguish along the first
dimension because the QE and EE mailings make different requests of recipients: initial
enrollment at a pre-selected contribution rate and asset allocation in the case of QE, and only an
increase to the pre-selected contribution rate in the case of EE. The second dimension is
important because it affects selection into our sample. Employees with a 6% contribution rate
default had to actively opt out of their default to a contribution rate below 6% in order to be
eligible for QE or EE, so no QE or EE recipient with this default was completely passive before
the mailing. Similarly, employees with a 0% contribution rate default had to opt out of their
default to a positive contribution rate below 6% in order to become eligible for EE.5 But in order
to be eligible for QE, employees with a 0% contribution rate default had to be completely
passive. This last subpopulation contains some employees who genuinely wanted to contribute
5
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nothing to the 401(k) and some employees who were contributing nothing simply because of
inertia. Prior research shows that the inertial group is likely to be large (Madrian and Shea, 2001;
Choi et al., 2002 and 2004; Beshears et al., 2008).6 Because people who are contributing nothing
to the 401(k) simply because of inertia are likely to have weaker convictions about their optimal
savings rate than people who have actively chosen to contribute little, we expected QE recipients
with a 0% contribution rate default to be the subpopulation most susceptible to the peer
information intervention that we studied.
In the taxonomy of Harrison and List (2004), our study is a “natural field experiment,”
since subjects never learned that they were part of an experiment. We use administrative plan
data to track contribution rate changes during the month following our mailing.
We measure the average effect of the presence of peer information by comparing how
much more the peer information treatment groups increased their contribution rates than the
control group. We also independently estimate the effect of the magnitude of the peer
information value that employees saw. To do this, we exploit two sources of variation in the peer
information value. First, two employees of the same age were exposed to different peer
information values if one was randomly assigned to see information about coworkers in her fiveyear age bracket and the other to see information about coworkers in her ten-year age bracket.
Second, two employees who are similar in age but on opposite sides of a boundary separating
adjacent five-year or adjacent ten-year age brackets would see different peer information values.
We find that among QE recipients with a 0% contribution rate default—those whom we
expected to be most susceptible to our information treatment—receiving peer information
significantly reduced the likelihood of subsequently enrolling in the plan from 9.9% to 6.3%, a
decrease of approximately one-third. These recipients’ enrollment was also decreasing in the
magnitude of the peer information value communicated. A one percentage point increase in the
reported fraction of coworkers already enrolled in the plan significantly reduced the enrollment
rate by 1.8 percentage points and significantly reduced the average before-tax contribution rate
change by 0.11% of income (which is one-fifth of the average contribution rate change among
control QE recipients with a 0% contribution default).
6

Prior to the mailing, the plan participation rate was 70% for employees with a non-enrollment default and 96% for
employees with a 6% contribution rate default. The latter figure does not include employees with less than 90 days
of tenure, since they are likely to have had automatic enrollment pending.

4

We do not find statistically significant evidence that the peer information intervention on
average altered the savings behavior of the other three subpopulations that had previously opted
out of their default. There is some indication (at the 10% significance level) that the magnitude
of the peer information value reported matters for these subpopulations. Among QE recipients
who had previously opted out of a 6% contribution rate default, a one percentage point increase
in the reported fraction of coworkers already enrolled in the plan increased the enrollment rate by
1.1 percentage points and increased the average before-tax contribution rate change by 0.06% of
income; both of these changes are about 1.5 times the relevant control group mean. Among EE
recipients who had opted out of a 6% contribution rate default, a one percentage point increase in
the reported fraction of participants contributing at least 6% of their pay to the plan increased
before-tax contribution rate changes by 0.07% of income—about one-fourth of the relevant
control group mean.
The finding that QE recipients with a 0% contribution rate default respond negatively to
peer information by decreasing their likelihood of enrolling in the savings plan is surprising, but
there is some precedent for perverse unintended “boomerang effects” (Clee and Wicklund, 1980;
Ringold, 2002) from peer information interventions. Schultz et al. (2007) find that among
households with low initial energy consumption, a treatment group that received information
about the energy consumption of nearby residences engaged in less energy conservation than a
control group that did not receive such information.7 Bhargava and Manoli (2011) document that
households eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit are less likely to take up the credit when
they are told that overall take-up rates are high.8
Relative to these studies, an important contribution of our experiment is that it provides
evidence distinguishing between two possible forces behind boomerang effects: negative belief
updates and oppositional reactions. The boomerang effects in previous field experiments could
be driven by negative belief updates—individuals learning that the promoted behavior is less
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Allcott (2011), Costa and Kahn (2013), and Ayres, Raseman, and Shih (2013) also examine household responses to
information about neighbors’ energy consumption, but they do not find boomerang effects.
8
In related studies, Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler (2013) document that peer information regarding tax
compliance can have positive or negative effects on compliance depending on the subpopulation studied. Carrell,
Sacerdote, and West (2013) find unintended effects in another kind of peer intervention that attempted to use peer
influence to improve the academic performance of the lowest ability students. Ashraf, Bandiera, and Lee (2014) find
that the anticipation of relative performance information reduces performance among low ability students in a
community health worker training program.

5

common than they previously believed and decreasing their own engagement in the behavior as a
result (Schultz et al., 2007). In contrast, it is unlikely that our boomerang effects are driven by
negative belief updates. Using randomized variation in the peer participation value shown to
individuals, we find that QE recipients with a 0% contribution rate default are less likely to
enroll in the savings plan when they see that a higher fraction of their peers are participating in
the plan. Instead of shifting their behavior towards their updated beliefs about the peer norm,
individuals shift their behavior away from the updated beliefs. We label such a response an
oppositional reaction.
We analyze treatment effect heterogeneity to better understand the drivers of oppositional
reactions. Motivated by recent evidence that relative income comparisons within workplace peer
groups can reduce job satisfaction for low-income workers (Card et al., 2012), we split
employees in our experiment into two groups based on whether they are above or below the
median income of the firm’s employees in the given employee’s U.S. state. We find that the
oppositional reaction among QE recipients with a 0% default is concentrated among employees
with low relative incomes. This result raises the possibility that information about peers’ savings
choices discourages low-income employees by making their relative economic status more
salient, reducing their motivation to increase their savings rates and generating an oppositional
reaction. Employees with low relative income in the experiment’s other three subpopulations
also exhibit more negative responses to peer information than employees with high relative
income, although the statistical significance of these interactions is not as strong. In addition, we
find evidence that some employees become discouraged when they learn that a savings rate that
they find challenging has already been attained by many of their peers.
Discouragement from upward social comparisons is unlikely to be the only factor that
drives oppositional reactions, but it should be a consideration for policymakers or managers
contemplating peer information interventions because it is potentially present in other contexts
given the ubiquity of relative status concerns. Our field experiment highlights one channel
through which the unintended consequences of financial decision-making interventions can
overwhelm the intended consequences (see also Carlin, Gervais, and Manso, 2013).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides background information on the firm we
study. Section II describes our experimental design, and Section III describes our data. Section
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IV presents our empirical results, and Section V discusses possible mechanisms driving our
findings. Section VI concludes.

I. Company Background
The company that ran our field experiment is a manufacturing firm with approximately
15,000 U.S. employees. About a fifth of the employees are represented by one of five unions. In
general, unionized workers are employed on the manufacturing shop floor, although not all shop
floor workers are unionized. The firm offers both defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution
(DC) retirement plans to its employees. The details of the DB plans vary according to an
employee’s union membership, but a typical employee receives an annual credit of 4% to 6% of
her salary in a cash balance plan, as well as interest credit on accumulated balances. Upon
retirement, the employee receives an annuity based on the notional balance accrued in the plan.
The details of the DC plan, which is the focus of our study, also depend on an employee’s
union membership. In general, employees do not need to meet a minimum service requirement
before becoming eligible for the plan. Participants can contribute up to 50% of their eligible pay
to the plan on a before-tax basis, subject to IRS limits.9 For most employees, the firm makes a
matching contribution proportional to the employee’s own before-tax contribution up to a
threshold. These matching contributions vest immediately. Table II describes the matching
formulas that apply to different employee groups. After-tax contributions to the plan are also
allowed but not matched. All employees can allocate plan balances among 21 mutual funds,
eleven of which are target date retirement funds. Employer stock is not an investment option.
On January 1, 2008, all non-union employees not already contributing to the 401(k) plan
were automatically enrolled at a before-tax contribution rate of 6% of pay unless they opted out
or elected another contribution rate.10 The default investment for automatically enrolled
employees was the target date retirement fund whose target retirement date was closest to the
employee’s anticipated retirement date. Non-union employees hired after January 1, 2008 were
also subject to automatic enrollment 60 days after hire unless they actively opted out. Automatic
enrollment was not implemented for unionized employees until January 1, 2009—after our
9

In 2008, the year of the experiment, the annual contribution limit was $15,500 for workers younger than 50 and
$20,500 for workers older than 50.
10
Employees were informed in advance that they would be automatically enrolled unless they opted out.
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sample period ends—because the collective bargaining negotiations necessary to effect the
change did not take place until the fall of 2008.

II. Experimental Design
The peer information intervention targeted non-participating and low-saving U.S.
employees who were at least 20 years old and at most 69 years old as of July 31, 2008.11 “Nonparticipants” were defined as employees who were eligible for but had never enrolled in the
401(k) plan as of July 14, 2008. Two groups of non-participants were excluded from the
intervention. The first group is employees who receive a special pension benefit in lieu of an
employer match.12 The second group is employees with a 6% default contribution rate who were
within the first 60 days of their employment at the company on July 14, 2008 and had not opted
out of automatic enrollment; these employees were likely to be automatically enrolled soon after
the intervention date, so the intervention would serve little purpose for them. “Low savers” were
defined as employees who were enrolled in the 401(k) plan but whose before-tax contribution
rate was less than both their employer match threshold and 6% as of July 14, 2008.13 The
majority of employees in our experiment (72%) have a match threshold of 6%, but the match
threshold varies by union status and is less than 6% for some unionized employees and greater
than 6% for others (see Table II).14
We used a stratified randomization scheme to allocate intervention-eligible employees to
three equally sized treatment groups. We first sorted employees into bins based on age as of July
31, 2008, plan participation status (enrolled or not enrolled), administrative grouping within the
firm, and employer match structure (and therefore union status and contribution rate default).
11

Employees younger than 20 or older than 69 years of age were excluded from the intervention because there are
so few employees in these categories that reporting peer information about these age groups could potentially
divulge the savings decisions of individual employees.
12
Only 52 employees receive this special pension benefit but otherwise met the criteria for inclusion in the
intervention.
13
We did not consider after-tax contribution rates when classifying low savers. Approximately 9% of plan
participants make after-tax contributions, and approximately 9% of the employees we classified as low savers were
making after-tax contributions at the time of the experiment. If we had limited the intervention to employees whose
combined before-tax and after-tax contribution rates were less than both their employer match threshold and 6%,
approximately 7% of the low savers would have been excluded.
14
One match formula limits employer matching contributions to a maximum of $325 per year. We did not observe
the dollar amount of matching contributions as of July 14, 2008, so the definition of low savers did not exclude
employees who had reached the maximum. The results of our analysis do not change meaningfully if all low savers
who faced this match formula are dropped from the sample.
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Within each of these bins, employees were randomly assigned to receive no peer information,
information about the savings behavior of peers in their five-year age bracket, or information
about the savings behavior of peers in their ten-year age bracket. Note that all of the 5-year
brackets had end points at ages 24, 29, 34, etc. In other words, all subjects between ages 20 and
24 in the 5-year peer treatment saw the same peer information. Likewise, all of the 10-year
brackets had end points at ages 29, 39, 49, etc. In other words, all subjects between ages 20 and
29 in the 10-year peer treatment saw the same peer information. Psychology research indicates
that the effect of social comparisons on behavior is most powerful when the reference group is
similar to the target individual on one or more dimensions, such as age (Jones and Gerard, 1967;
Suls and Wheeler, 2000).
On July 30, 2008, Quick Enrollment and Easy Escalation mailings were sent to target
employees, implying that employees probably received these mailings between August 1 and
August 4, 2008. Both the QE and EE mailings gave a deadline of August 22, 2008 for returning
the forms, but this deadline was not enforced. Appendices A, B, C, and D show sample QE and
EE letters.
Non-participants received a QE mailing, which described the benefits of enrollment in
the 401(k) plan, especially highlighting the employer matching contribution.15 By checking a box
on the form, signing it, and returning it in the provided pre-addressed postage-paid envelope,
employees could begin contributing to the plan at a 6% before-tax rate invested in an age-linked
target date retirement fund. Employees were reminded that they could change their contribution
rate and asset allocation at any time by calling their benefits center or visiting their benefits
website. The mailing sent to employees in the peer information treatments additionally displayed
the following text: “Join the A% of B-C year old employees at [company] who are already
enrolled in the [plan].” Letters sent to employees in the no peer information control condition
simply omitted this sentence. The number A was calculated using data on all savings-planeligible employees in the five-year or ten-year age bracket applicable to the recipient. These
participation rates, reported in Table III, ranged from 77% to 93%. The numbers B and C are the
boundaries of the relevant five-year or ten-year age bracket.

15

Information on employer contributions varied according to the match structure facing the individual employee.
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Low savers received EE mailings, which also emphasized that employees were forgoing
employer matching contributions.16 A low-saving employee could increase her before-tax
contribution rate to 6%, invested according to her current asset allocation, by completing the
form and returning it in the provided pre-addressed postage-paid envelope. Like the QE
mailings, the EE mailings reminded recipients that they could change their contribution rate or
asset allocation through their benefits call center or website. The EE peer information text, which
did not appear in the mailings to employees in the no peer information control condition, read:
“Join the D% of B-C year old [plan] participants at [company] who are already contributing at
least 6% to the [plan].” Data on all plan participants in the relevant five-year or ten-year age
bracket were used to calculate D, which ranged from 72% to 81% (see Table III).
Due to technological constraints in the processing of QE and EE forms, all QE and EE
reply forms offered only a 6% contribution rate option. Every employee with a 6% contribution
rate default had a 6% match threshold, but the match threshold differed from 6% for 77% of
mailing recipients with a 0% contribution rate default. The 6% contribution rate on the QE and
EE forms could have been less appealing to employees with a different match threshold. Within
the group of recipients with a 0% default, we have analyzed those with a match threshold other
than 6% separately from those with a match threshold of 6%. The peer information treatment
effect estimates are similar across these subsamples, although the standard errors of the estimates
for the 6% threshold group are large because of the small sample size.

III. Data
Our data were provided by Aon Hewitt, the 401(k) plan administrator. The data include a
cross-sectional snapshot of all employees in our experiment on July 14, 2008, just prior to our
intervention. This snapshot contains individual-level data on each employee’s plan participation
status, contribution rate, birth date, administrative grouping within the firm, employer match
structure, union membership, and contribution rate default. A second cross-section contains the
new plan enrollments and contribution rate changes of employees between August 4, 2008 and
September 8, 2008—right after the mailing was sent. The final cross-section contains employees’
gender, hire date, and 2008 salary, which we annualize for employees who left the firm before
16
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the end of 2008. In Section V, when we analyze treatment effect heterogeneity, we augment our
data set with information on the state of residence and 2008 salary of all employees who were
active at the firm (including those not in our experiment) as of July 14, 2008, as well as
information on the monthly history of before-tax contribution rates for each employee.

IV. Effects of Providing Peer Information
We divide the discussion of our main empirical results into five parts. First, in Section
IV.A, we discuss the characteristics of the employees who received mailings. Second, in Section
IV.B, we analyze the effect of providing peer information in the QE mailing by comparing the
savings choices of peer information QE treatment groups to those of the control group that
received the QE mailing with no peer information. Third, in Section IV.C, we restrict our
attention to the peer information QE treatment groups and examine the response to the
magnitude of the peer information value in the mailing. Fourth, in Section IV.D, we examine the
impact of the peer information given in the EE mailings. And finally, in Section V, we discuss
possible explanations for the perverse peer information effects we observe among QE recipients
with a 0% contribution rate default.

A. Employee Characteristics
Table IV presents summary statistics for the sample that received mailings, broken out by
the type of mailing (QE or EE), contribution rate default (0% or 6%), and the type of peer
information received. The majority of the sample is male, although this fraction varies
considerably across the different subpopulations: 66% among QE recipients with a 0% default,
76% among QE recipients with a 6% default, 55% among EE recipients with a 0% default, and
68% among EE recipients with a 6% default. The average age is 41 years, and average tenure is
high—9 years among QE recipients with a 0% default, 7 years among QE recipients with a 6%
default, and 11 years in both EE subpopulations. Mean annual salary is lowest among QE
recipients with a 0% default (about $38,000) and highest among EE recipients with a 6% default
(about $57,000). Issues surrounding relative salaries may play a role in explaining differences in
responses to peer information across the four groups, a topic to which we return in Section V.
Among the two EE subpopulations, average initial before-tax contribution rates are about 2%.
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B. Effect of Providing Peer Information in Quick Enrollment
To estimate the effect of providing peer information in the QE mailing, we compare the
savings choices of peer information QE treatment groups to those of the control group that
received no peer information. The first two columns of Table V list, by contribution rate default,
the fraction of employees in each QE treatment group who enrolled in the savings plan between
August 4, 2008 and September 8, 2008. The last two columns report the average before-tax
contribution rate change during the same time period as a percent of income for each QE
treatment group, again broken out by contribution rate default.17 Note that the contribution rate
changes are almost exactly equal to 6% of the enrollment rates because the QE response cards do
not permit contribution rates other than 6%.18 We report results both in terms of enrollment rates
and in terms of contribution rate changes because the two measures are both useful for
understanding economic magnitudes. In addition, we wish to be consistent with our presentation
of the EE subpopulation results, for which the simple relationship between the two measures
does not hold. To statistically test the effect of providing peer information, we pool the five-year
and ten-year age bracket peer information treatments (row 4 of Table V).
We first look at the non-participants with a 0% contribution rate default. This is the subpopulation that we expected to have the most malleable retirement savings choices. Among this
group, 6.3% of employees who were given peer information enrolled in the plan, while 9.9% of
those whose mailings did not include peer information enrolled in the plan, a statistically
significant difference of 3.6 percentage points. This implies that peer information provision
reduces savings plan enrollment by a third. The difference in enrollment rates corresponds to a
20 basis point reduction in the average before-tax contribution rate change as a percent of
income, a difference that is significant at the 10% level.
In contrast, we do not find evidence that providing peer information on average affects
non-participants who previously opted out of automatic enrollment at a 6% default contribution
rate. There was a 2.7% enrollment rate and a 15 basis point before-tax contribution rate increase
within the pooled peer information treatments versus a 0.7% enrollment rate and a 4 basis point
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Individuals who ceased employment at the firm between August 4, 2008 and September 8, 2008 are treated as if
their participation status and contribution rate on their departure date continued unchanged until September 8, 2008.
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QE recipients could choose alternative contribution rates by using the benefits website or calling the benefits
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before-tax contribution rate increase within the control group without peer information. The
differences between these two arms are not statistically significant.
Table VI analyzes the average effect of providing peer information in the QE mailings
within an ordinary least squares regression framework. The sample is non-participants who
received QE mailings. In the first two columns, the dependent variable is binary, taking a value
of one if the employee initiated savings plan participation between August 4, 2008 and
September 8, 2008;19 in the next two columns, the dependent variable is the change in the
employee’s before-tax contribution rate during the same time period. The regressions control for
gender, log tenure, log salary, and a linear spline in age with knot points every five years starting
at age 22½.20 The regression-adjusted impact of providing peer information is qualitatively and
quantitatively similar to the effect estimated from comparing means in Table V. Including peer
information decreases enrollment by 4.0 percentage points and reduces the change in the beforetax contribution rate by 22 basis points for non-participants with a 0% contribution rate default,
while it has positive but insignificant effects on non-participants with a 6% contribution rate
default. Interestingly, for QE recipients with a 0% default, the regression coefficients on log
tenure are strongly negative. For QE recipients with a 6% default, the regression coefficients on
log tenure are also negative but not statistically significant. One possible interpretation for this
result is that individuals who have been employed at the firm for a long time but have never
enrolled in the savings plan are people who strongly believe that it is not optimal for them to
participate in the plan.

C. Effect of the Peer Information Value’s Magnitude in Quick Enrollment
To examine how the magnitude of the peer information value received by employees
affected responsiveness to the QE mailing, we limit our attention to the employees who were in
the two peer information QE treatments. An important confound our analysis must address is the
19

We report the estimates from linear probability regressions for the binary dependent variables instead of probit or
logit regressions because of problems with perfect predictability. Our flexible age controls sometimes perfectly
predict failure, requiring us to drop observations from probit or logit regressions. Adjusting the sample for each
regression specification would make it difficult to compare results across specifications, and using a common
minimal sample for all specifications could potentially give a misleading picture of the results. Thus, we report the
results of linear probability regressions, which allow us to maintain a consistent sample and include all observations.
20
As noted in Table IV, salary information is missing for a small number of employees. We exclude these
employees from regression samples throughout the paper. We use a linear spline in age instead of age group dummy
variables in Table VI to be consistent with Table VII.
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“reflection problem” (Manski, 1993). Because our experiment provided employees with peer
information related to their five-year or ten-year age brackets, the peer information value embeds
not only information about the peer group but also information about the age-related
characteristics of the mailing recipient. Throughout our analysis, we therefore study the
relationship between responsiveness to the mailing and the magnitude of the peer information
value while controlling for a flexible function of age—specifically, an age spline with knot
points every five years starting at age 22½.
Our empirical strategy identifies the effect of the peer information value’s magnitude
using two sources of variation. First, two employees of the same age may see different peer
information values if one is randomly assigned to receive information about her five-year age
bracket and the other is randomly assigned to receive information about her ten-year age bracket.
Second, two employees who are nearly identical in age may see different peer information values
if their ages are on opposite sides of a boundary separating two adjacent five-year or ten-year age
brackets.
Table VII presents results from our baseline regression specification for analyzing the
impact of the peer information value’s magnitude. The coefficient estimates are from ordinary
least-squares regressions for the sample of non-participants who received QE mailings with peer
information. The outcomes of interest are the same as in Table VI—enrollment in the savings
plan or the change in the employee’s before-tax contribution rate between August 4, 2008 and
September 8, 2008—as are the other regression controls.
For non-participants with a 0% contribution rate default, a one percentage point increase
in the reported fraction of coworkers participating in the plan results in a statistically significant
1.8 percentage point decrease in the probability of enrolling in the plan and a statistically
significant 11 basis point lower change in the before-tax contribution rate. To put these estimates
in perspective, the peer information values received by non-participants range from 77% to 93%,
a difference of 16 percentage points (Table III). This implies an enrollment rate and before-tax
contribution rate change that differ by 28 percentage points and 1.7% of income, respectively,
between employees who receive the lowest and the highest peer information values—a very
large difference relative to the 9.9% enrollment response and 0.6% before-tax contribution rate
change of QE recipients with a 0% default who received no peer information (Table V). Note
that these estimates cannot be directly compared to the estimates in Table VI, as the regressions
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reported in Table VI measure the effect of the presence of peer information, while the
regressions reported in Table VII measure the effect of the magnitude of the peer information
value received, conditional on receiving peer information.
In contrast, among non-participants with a 6% default, a one percentage point increase in
the peer information value results in a 1.1 percentage point increase in the enrollment rate and a
6 basis point higher increase in the contribution rate, although these effects are significant only at
the 10% level. Note the complementarity of the results in Tables VI and VII. For nonparticipants with a 0% default, receiving peer information reduces the response rate to the QE
mailings on average (Table VI), and receiving a peer information value with a higher magnitude
further reduces the QE response rate (Table VII). For QE recipients with a 6% default, receiving
peer information leads to a small but insignificant increase in the response rate on average (Table
VI), and the response rate also increases in the magnitude of the peer information value (Table
VII).
Table VIII shows the importance of the two sources of variation in the peer information
value used to generate the results in Table VII. To facilitate comparison, the first column
reproduces the peer information value coefficient estimates from Table VII. The coefficients in
the second column of Table VIII are estimated by adding to the baseline regression specification
a set of five-year age bracket dummies that correspond to the age brackets in the five-year age
bracket peer information treatment. With the inclusion of these dummies, the effect of the peer
information value is no longer identified using discontinuities across age bracket boundaries;
rather, identification comes entirely from differences between employees in the five-year versus
ten-year age bracket peer information treatments. The peer information coefficients in this
specification are slightly larger than in the baseline specification and retain the same qualitative
level of statistical significance.
The regression specification presented in the last column of Table VIII excludes the fiveyear age group dummies used in the second column and instead estimates different linear splines
in age for employees in the five-year versus ten-year age bracket peer information treatments.
Here, identification comes only from comparing employees on opposite sides of an age bracket
boundary at which the peer information value jumps discontinuously. Under this specification,
the peer information value coefficients do not change sign, but they are smaller in magnitude and
lose their statistical significance. Hence, the effects estimated in the baseline specification from
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Table VII are largely driven by the differences in peer information values between the five-year
and ten-year age bracket peer information treatments.
In Table IX, we investigate the robustness of our peer information value results to the
manner in which we control for age in our regressions. The first row presents the peer
information value coefficients from our baseline specifications in Table VII to facilitate
comparison. In the second row, we replace the original linear spline (knot points every five
years) with a linear spline featuring knot points every 2½ years, starting at age 22½. This spline
is more flexible and hence gives a sense of whether the structure imposed by the original spline
produces misleading results. The coefficients on the peer information value do not change
meaningfully with the more flexible spline, and their statistical significance strengthens for
employees with a 6% contribution rate default.
One additional element that varied across the QE mailings was the fund in which
employee contributions would be invested absent any other election by the employee. (This was
not a factor in the EE mailings, since all employees currently contributing to the plan had a
preexisting asset allocation.) This default fund was a target date retirement fund (e.g., Fund
2020) chosen according to the recipient’s anticipated retirement age and thus varying
systematically with age. Although we think it is unlikely that employees would respond to the
mailings differentially depending on the target date retirement fund offered, we nonetheless try
to account for this possibility by including dummy variables in the regressions for the exact
target date retirement fund mentioned in the mailings. As shown in the third row of Table IX,
incorporating these controls does not change our main results.
The specifications in the last two rows of Table IX are designed to address another set of
issues. The two sources of identifying variation in the peer information value are associated with
an employee’s position within an age bracket. Two employees of the same age who are randomly
assigned to the five-year versus ten-year age bracket peer information treatments differ not only
in the peer information values they see, but also in the set of peers for whom those values are
defined, with one group (the five-year group) more narrowly defined than the other. Similarly,
two employees on opposite sides of a boundary separating adjacent five-year or ten-year age
brackets are exposed to different peer information values but are also in different situations
relative to their peer groups, with one older than most of her peer group and the other younger.
To partially control for these factors, we add to our regressions variables capturing an
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individual’s position relative to her peer information comparison group. The regressions reported
in the fourth row of Table IX include linear and squared terms for the difference in years
between the employee’s age and the mean age in her peer group; the regressions reported in the
fifth row of Table IX include linear and squared terms for the employee’s percentile rank in age
within her peer group. All coefficient estimates for the QE recipients with a 0% contribution rate
default are qualitatively similar to the baseline coefficient estimates. For the QE recipients with a
6% contribution rate default, the coefficients remain similar in magnitude but lose significance
even at the 10% level when we control for the difference between the employee’s age and her
peer group’s mean age.

D. Effect of Providing Peer Information in Easy Escalation
We now turn our attention to the impact of providing peer information to the low savers
who received the EE mailings. The first two columns of Table X list the fraction of low savers,
separately by their contribution rate default, who increased their before-tax contribution rate
between August 4, 2008 and September 8, 2008. The last two columns of Table X report the
average before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The last row in Table X
shows that the differences between the groups who did and did not receive peer information are
close to zero and insignificant for both 0% and 6% default contribution rate participants.
Table XI reports the OLS-adjusted average impact of providing peer information in EE.
In the first two columns, the dependent variable is a binary variable taking a value of one if the
employee increased her before-tax contribution rate between August 4, 2008 and September 8,
2008; in the next two columns, the dependent variable is the change in the employee’s before-tax
contribution rate during the same time period. In addition to the controls used in Table VI for the
QE recipients, the regressions for the EE recipients include a full set of indicator variables for
each employee’s before-tax contribution rate on July 14, 2008—two weeks prior to the mailing.
The results in Table XI are qualitatively similar to the raw differences reported in Table X:
receiving peer information has a negligible and statistically insignificant effect on savings
responses on average.
Table XII presents regressions that identify the impact of the peer information value’s
magnitude in the EE mailings. The dependent variables are the same as in Table XI. As we did in
the corresponding analysis for QE, we restrict the regression sample to EE recipients who were
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given peer information. We find that the peer information value’s magnitude has a positive but
insignificant effect on the probability of increasing one’s before-tax contribution rate. The peer
information value’s magnitude also has an insignificant effect on the before-tax contribution rate
change for recipients with a 0% contribution rate default, but a positive and marginally
significant effect for recipients with a 6% contribution rate default. For the latter group, a one
percentage point increase in the peer information value results in a 7 basis point higher increase
in the before-tax contribution rate.

V. Mechanisms Driving the Effects of Peer Information
The negative response of non-participants with a 0% contribution rate default (unionized
employees) to the peer information in QE mailings is surprising. This contrary reaction is
probably not due to learning that coworkers had a lower plan participation rate than expected,
since the enrollment rate and contribution rate changes of non-participants with a 0% default
varied inversely with the magnitude of the peer information value they received. Instead, the
boomerang effect among QE recipients with a 0% default appears to be an oppositional reaction.
In this section, we discuss the mechanisms that may be driving the oppositional reaction.
The evidence suggests that peer information is discouraging and demotivating for some
subpopulations of employees. In particular, discouragement from being compared to peers who
have higher economic status seems to play a role, as the negative response to peer information is
concentrated among individuals who have salaries that are low in the pay distribution of the
firm’s employees in the individual’s state. There is also some evidence that employees can be
discouraged when a goal that is difficult for them to attain is revealed to be a goal that many
peers have achieved. EE recipients with a 0% default reacted more negatively to peer
information if they initially had a low contribution rate rather than a high contribution rate,
making the goal of increasing to a 6% contribution rate harder to reach.
Our experiment was not specifically designed to test these explanations for the effect of
peer information, so our analysis of treatment effect heterogeneity must be interpreted with
caution. Nonetheless, issues of low relative status and difficult-to-achieve goals arise naturally in
many settings, so this pattern of responsiveness is potentially relevant for other contexts in which
peer information interventions might be deployed.
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A. Relative Salary and Discouragement from Peer Information
Recent research by Card et al. (2012) indicates that job satisfaction is affected by an
employee’s rank within the salary distribution of that employee’s peers. Card et al. randomly
assigned employees of the University of California to receive or not to receive information about
a website that disclosed the pay of all University of California employees. Among employees
below the median pay for their occupation category (i.e., faculty versus staff) within their
department, the information treatment had a negative effect on job satisfaction, while there was
no significant effect for employees above the median pay for their occupation category within
their department. Relative pay concerns are quite local. For staff (who constitute over 80% of the
sample), being below the campus-wide median staff pay had smaller negative effects than being
below their department’s median staff pay.
Drawing on these findings, we test how the peer information effect in our experiment
varies with an employee’s salary rank among local coworkers.21 Employees are likely to have
some knowledge, through both formal and informal workplace communication channels, of their
positions in the local pay distribution at the firm. Having one’s savings choices compared to
coworkers’ savings choices in our experiment may serve as a reminder of relative economic
standing, creating feelings of discouragement and thereby triggering an oppositional reaction
among employees with low relative income. Larger peer savings numbers would exacerbate
discouragement by increasing the size of the perceived economic gap between the low-income
employee and his coworkers.22
Our data are not as detailed as the University of California data, so we calculate an
employee’s rank within the salary distribution for all employees at the firm in the same state.23
This peer group includes employees who were not part of our experiment but excludes
employees who were not active at the firm as of July 14, 2008. Two states account for half of the
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employees in the experiment, but 23 other states account for the remaining employees.24 Internet
Appendix Table I reports the distribution of employees in our experiment across within-state
income quartiles. Employees in our experiment disproportionately fall in the lower quartiles of
the distribution, especially in the case of employees with a 0% default.
We begin by studying the reaction to peer information among QE recipients with a 0%
default. To estimate heterogeneity in the effect of the presence of peer information, we augment
the regression specifications from Table VI with two additional explanatory variables: an
indicator for being below the median income among active employees at the firm in the same
state and the interaction between that indicator and the indicator for receiving peer information.
The first two columns of Table XIII display the results.
The coefficients on the uninteracted dummy for receiving peer information show that QE
recipients with a 0% default and high relative income have a small positive but insignificant
response to the presence of peer information. The coefficient on the interaction term, however, is
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level in both columns. Peer information causes
QE recipients with a 0% default and low relative income to decrease their enrollment rate by 5.2
percentage points more and decrease their before-tax contribution rate by 29 basis points of pay
more than QE recipients with a 0% default and high relative income.
Turning to heterogeneity in the effect of the peer information value’s magnitude in Quick
Enrollment, we expand the set of explanatory variables in the Table VII regression specifications
to include the indicator for having an income below the median among active employees at the
firm in the same state, the interaction between the below-median income indicator and the peer
information value received (the participation rate among employees in the relevant age group),
and the interaction between the below-median income indicator and all elements of the age
spline. It is necessary to allow separate age splines for the high and low relative income
employees so that the effect of the peer information value is identified only using variation
generated by discontinuities around age group boundaries and differences between the five-year
and ten-year age group peer information values.
The last two columns of Table XIII show that for QE recipients with a 0% default and
high relative income, a one percentage point increase in the peer information value increases the
24
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likelihood of enrolling in the savings plan by 1.0 percentage point and increases the before-tax
contribution rate change by 6 basis points of pay, although neither effect is statistically
significant. For low relative income employees, however, the effect of a one percentage point
increase in the peer information value is 2.8 percentage points more negative for the likelihood
of enrolling and 17 basis points more negative for the before-tax contribution rate change. Both
of these interactions are statistically significant at the 5% level.
In sum, the oppositional reaction we identified among QE recipients with a 0% default is
present only among employees with low income relative to other employees at the firm in the
same state. This pattern suggests that discouragement from upward social comparisons may play
a role in generating the oppositional reaction to peer information in our experiment. Further
evidence in favor of this hypothesis is found in Table XIV, which shows that the treatment
interactions with being in the bottom half of the firm-wide salary distribution are insignificant,
with point estimates that are smaller in magnitude or of the opposite sign compared to the
treatment interactions with being in the bottom half of the firm’s state-specific salary
distribution. Recall that Card et al. (2012) find that employees are most concerned about their
salary rank relative to local coworkers, so vulnerability to discouragement from peer
comparisons should depend more on where the employee stands in the local firm wage
distribution than in the firm-wide wage distribution. Furthermore, employees are more likely to
be unaware of their location in the firm-wide wage distribution than in the local wage
distribution. We have also explored treatment interactions with being in the bottom half of the
overall state-wide pay distribution (which includes individuals who do not work for the firm) and
treatment interactions with having a salary below $30,000. As shown in Internet Appendix
Tables II and III, none of these interactions is significant.
Internet Appendix Tables IV through VII show analogous regressions for the other three
subpopulations, QE recipients with a 6% default and EE recipients with a 0% or a 6% default.
We generally find the same patterns of a negative peer information treatment interaction with
having below-median income among other employees at the firm in one’s state and a weaker
treatment interaction with having below-median income in the firm-wide distribution. The
interactions with having below-median income among other employees at the firm in one’s state
are not always statistically significant, but for each of the three subpopulations, there is at least
one negative interaction with either the presence of peer information or the peer information
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value that is significant at the 10% level or better, and no significant positive interactions. One
interesting pattern is that in these three subpopulations, unlike among QE recipients with a 0%
default, being below the median local income does not tend to cause employees to move away
from the peer norm. Rather it merely attenuates the positive reaction to peer information found
among above-median-income employees. A possible interpretation of this difference is that the
type of employee who takes an active role in his or her savings (and thus ends up in these three
subpopulations) is less prone to discouragement from upward comparisons.

B. Difficult Goals and Discouragement from Peer Information
While discouragement caused by upward socioeconomic comparisons seems to
contribute to negative reactions to peer information, discouragement driven by other related
mechanisms may simultaneously be at work. In particular, the psychology literature documents
that setting goals for individuals can motivate increased effort and achievement in tasks ranging
from problem solving to wood chopping, especially when the goals are challenging (Locke et al.,
1981; Mento, Steel, and Karren, 1987; Gollwitzer, 1999; Heath, Larrick, and Wu, 1999; Locke
and Latham, 2002). But learning that a goal one finds extremely difficult has already been
achieved by many of one’s peers may damage one’s self-esteem, making the goal feel more
unattainable. When goals are too difficult, people are more likely to reject them and to perform
poorly (Motowidlo, Loehr, and Dunnette, 1978; Mowen, Middlemist, and Luther, 1981; Erez and
Zidon, 1984; Lee, Locke, and Phan, 1997).
We have no observable variation in how challenging QE recipients might have viewed
the suggested 6% contribution rate to be, since all QE recipients had an initial contribution rate
of 0%. But EE recipients had starting contribution rates that varied from 0% to 5%. We
conjecture that EE recipients who initially had a lower contribution rate are more likely than EE
recipients who initially had a higher contribution rate to view the suggested 6% contribution rate
as a challenging goal.25 Internet Appendix Table VIII shows the contribution rate distribution of
EE recipients with a 0% default and a 6% default immediately before the experiment was
launched. The distributions are not perfectly uniform, but there is a meaningful number of
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employees in each sample at each contribution rate from 0% to 5%.26 We augment the regression
specifications in Table XI by including the interaction between the indicator for receiving peer
information and an indicator for having an initial contribution rate of 0%, 1%, or 2%. Indicators
for each of the six possible initial contribution rates are already included as explanatory
variables, omitting one to avoid collinearity with the constant.
In Table XV, columns 1 and 3 report the results for EE recipients with a 0% default, who
are the EE group most similar to the QE recipients with a 0% default. Consistent with the
hypothesis that the oppositional reaction among QE recipients with a 0% default is driven in part
by peer information interacting negatively with a difficult suggested goal, the estimated
coefficients on the interaction between the dummy for receiving peer information and the
dummy for having a low initial contribution rate are negative and statistically significant at the
10% level. Employees with high initial contribution rates respond to the presence of peer
information with a 3.8 percentage point increase in their likelihood of increasing their
contribution rates and an 18 basis points of pay increase in their before-tax contribution rate
change. The former estimate is not statistically significant, and the latter estimate is significant at
the 10% level. Employees with low initial contribution rates have a response to peer information
that is 8.7 percentage points more negative for the likelihood of a contribution rate increase and
38 basis points of pay more negative for the before-tax contribution rate change.
However, not all employees are demotivated when they learn that many of their peers
have achieved a difficult goal. Columns 2 and 4 of Table XV show that EE recipients with a 6%
default who have low initial contribution rates have a somewhat more positive response to peer
information than EE recipients with the same default and high initial contribution rates. The
effect on the binary indicator of whether the recipient increased his before-tax contribution rate is
not significant, but the effect on the average before-tax contribution rate change is significant at
the 10% level. For some subpopulations, learning that many peers achieved a challenging goal is
perhaps an encouraging signal of one’s own ability to achieve this goal.
In Internet Appendix Table IX, we examine the robustness of the findings in Table XV
by estimating separate treatment effects from the presence of peer information for each of the six
26
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than 0%.
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possible initial contribution rates. The results broadly corroborate the patterns we observe when
grouping the 0%, 1%, and 2% contribution rates together and the 3%, 4%, and 5% contribution
rates together. We have also investigated how EE recipients with low initial contribution rates
differ from EE recipients with high initial contribution rates in their responses to the magnitude
of the peer information value. Internet Appendix Table X shows the results from regressions that
expand the Table XII specifications by including the interaction between the dummy for having a
low initial contribution rate and the peer information value as well as the interaction between the
dummy for having a low initial contribution rate and all elements of the age spline. The results
are consistent with the results for the effect of the presence of peer information. Among EE
recipients with a 0% default, employees with a low initial contribution rate are more negatively
responsive to the peer information value than employees with a high initial contribution rate, and
among EE recipients with a 6% default, employees with a low initial contribution rate are
slightly more positively responsive to the peer information value than employees with a high
initial contribution rate. However, none of these interaction coefficients is statistically
significant.
Overall, there is some evidence that for employees with a 0% default, the oppositional
reactions we observe were caused in part by discouragement from learning that so many peers
had achieved such a challenging goal. However, not all subpopulations are discouraged by the
combination of more challenging goals and peer information.

C. Other Factors that Might Affect the Response to Peer Information
In this subsection, we consider other factors that may determine how individuals respond
to peer information. We have previously argued that employees who have never made an active
decision in the retirement savings plan (i.e., QE recipients with a 0% default contribution rate)
may respond more to peer information because they have weaker convictions about what their
savings rate should be. We now explore an extension of this argument: did EE recipients who
had not recently made an active decision regarding their contribution rate as of the beginning of
the experiment respond more to peer information? Such an association could exist if, for
example, the type of person who is prone to be passive is also prone to have weak convictions
about her optimal savings choice even after an active savings decision has been made at least
once.
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For each EE recipient, we use data on monthly contribution rate histories to calculate the
amount of time since the employee had last changed his or her before-tax contribution rate. For
some employees, the last change took place when they initially enrolled in the plan. We then
split employees into groups depending on whether the amount of time since their last change was
above or below the median for their sample (the 0% default sample or the 6% default sample, as
appropriate). In Internet Appendix Table XI, we add two explanatory variables to the Table XI
regression specifications, which study the effect of the presence of peer information for EE
recipients: an indicator for having an above-median time since the last contribution rate change
and the interaction between that indicator and the indicator for receiving peer information. The
estimated coefficients on these additional variables are small and never have a t-statistic greater
than one in absolute value. It may be the case that once an employee has thought about his
401(k) enough to make an active savings decision, the strength of his conviction about optimal
savings behavior in the plan does not covary with how long he remains at that contribution rate.27
Another factor that may have generated the oppositional response to peer information
among QE recipients with a 0% default is the perception that one’s optimal savings behavior is
negatively correlated with that of the coworkers used to construct the peer information value. QE
recipients with a 0% default were unionized employees, and because unionized employees
constituted only one-fifth of the firm’s workforce, company-wide 401(k) participation rates
largely reflected the choices of non-union workers. If unionized employees identify themselves
in opposition to non-union employees, they may prefer savings choices that are atypical by
company standards. We have tried to examine this hypothesis empirically by testing whether the
magnitudes of the peer information effects vary with the fraction of the peer reference group that
is unionized. The results do not support the hypothesis.
Also, QE recipients with a 0% default may have believed, due to an antagonistic
collective bargaining relationship with the firm, that savings messages sent by the company to
unionized employees like them were likely to be counter to their own best interests. A related

27

We do not examine heterogeneity in treatment effects for QE recipients with a 6% default according to the amount
of time since the last active decision because almost all employees in this sample last made an active decision when
they opted out of automatic enrollment at the beginning of 2008. Only a handful of employees in this group were
hired later in 2008 and opted out of automatic enrollment then.
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interpretation, in line with psychological reactance theory (Brehm, 1966), is that mistrust caused
QE recipients with a 0% default to perceive the peer information as coercive, leading them to act
contrary to the peer information in an effort to assert their independent agency. The weakness of
this set of hypotheses is that it is not clear why the inclusion of peer information would produce
greater mistrust than the control letter, which also strongly encouraged 401(k) participation, nor
why mistrust would be increasing in the magnitude of the peer information value. Furthermore,
while there have been occasional strikes at the firm, labor relations are not particularly strained,
either in general or at the time of the experiment.

VI. Conclusion
Our field experiment shows that exposure to information about the actions of peers can
generate an oppositional reaction. Among the subpopulation we expected to be most susceptible
to peer influence—employees not enrolled in the 401(k) plan who had a non-enrollment default
(in this case, unionized employees)—we found a negative, oppositional reaction to both the
presence of peer information and the magnitude of its value. On the other hand, employees who
had actively chosen a low 401(k) contribution rate exhibited some positive reaction to the
magnitude of the peer information value.
An analysis of treatment effect heterogeneity indicates that the oppositional reaction to
peer information exhibited by Quick Enrollment recipients with a non-enrollment default was
concentrated among employees with low incomes relative to their local coworkers. Thus, peer
information may have made these employees less likely to increase their savings because they
were discouraged by the reminder of their low economic status. We also find negative treatment
interactions with low relative income in the other subpopulations in our experiment.
In settings where many individuals may not know which choices are appropriate for their
circumstances, such as defined contribution savings plans, peer information interventions have a
number of appealing features. If the choices of the average person are reasonable, individuals
whose choices are in the extremes of the distribution can adjust upon learning about the typical
behavior of peers. At the same time, peer information interventions are not coercive—individuals
who are confident that it is appropriate for them to deviate from the peer norm are not forced to
change their decisions. Our results, however, reveal an important drawback of highlighting the
behavior of peers. Peer information inevitably contains an element of social comparison, and
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individuals with low status may react negatively to the information. A key issue for future
research is to develop a better understanding of how peer information interventions can be
shaped to minimize such oppositional reactions, perhaps by carefully selecting the reference
group to minimize discouraging social comparisons.
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Table I: Features of the Four Subpopulations in the Experiment
This table summarizes the key features of the four subpopulations that were targeted in the field
experiment.

Union
membership

Quick Enrollment recipients
0% contribution 6% contribution
rate default
rate default
Yes
No

Easy Escalation recipients
0% contribution 6% contribution
rate default
rate default
Yes
No

Savings plan
enrollment
mechanism

Opt-in

Opt-out
(automatic
enrollment)

Opt-in

Opt-out
(automatic
enrollment)

Savings plan
participation
status prior to
experiment

Non-participant

Non-participant

Participant

Participant

Savings plan
contribution rate
prior to
experiment

0%

0%

Less than 6%
and less than
their 401(k)
match threshold

Less than 6%
(which is their
401(k) match
threshold)

Savings plan
decision prior to
experiment

Passively
accepted default

Actively opted
out of plan

Actively chose
contribution rate

Actively chose
contribution rate

Table II: Employer Match Formulas
This table describes the employer match formulas that applied to different groups of employees
at the firm.
Number of employees included in
the mailing with this match
Match A

†

Match formula for before-tax contributions
100% on the first 1% of pay contributed
50% on the next 5% of pay contributed

Union
0

Non-union
3,158

126

0

Match B

The minimum of $325 or 50% on the first
2% of pay contributed

Match C

100% on the first 2% of pay contributed
50% on the next 2% of pay contributed
25% on the next 4% of pay contributed

1,114

0

Match D

100% on the first 2% of pay contributed
50% on the next 2% of pay contributed
25% on the next 2% of pay contributed

261

0

Match E

50% on the first 4% of pay contributed

135

0

Match F

50% on the first 6% of pay contributed

149

0

Match G†

None

0

0

This group was not included in the intervention.

Table III: Peer Information Values
This table lists the peer information values in the mailings sent to employees in the peer
information treatments. Employees not participating in the savings plan were sent the
participation rate of employees in either their 5-year or 10-year age bracket (first column).
Participating employees with before-tax contribution rates below both their match threshold and
6% were sent the fraction of participants in either their 5-year or 10-year age bracket whose
before-tax contribution rate was at least 6% (third column).

Savings plan
participation
rate

# of employees
sent
participation
rate

Fraction of
participants
contributing
≥ 6% of pay

# of
employees
sent ≥ 6%
contributor
fraction

5-year age brackets
20 – 24
25 – 29
30 – 34
35 – 39
40 – 44
45 – 49
50 – 54
55 – 59
60 – 64
65 – 69

77%
87%
90%
90%
92%
93%
91%
90%
88%
87%

61
72
45
61
55
41
56
44
35
7

79%
74%
72%
72%
73%
75%
77%
78%
79%
81%

57
155
161
162
166
172
142
102
47
7

10-year age brackets
20 – 29
30 – 39
40 – 49
50 – 59
60 – 69

83%
90%
92%
91%
88%

135
104
97
109
38

76%
72%
74%
78%
79%

202
331
339
240
55

Table IV: Sample Characteristics
This table summarizes the characteristics of Quick Enrollment recipients (Panel A) and Easy Escalation recipients (Panel B).
Employees are grouped by their contribution rate default and the type of peer information they received in their mailing. Salary data
are missing for some employees in the sample. These employees are excluded from the regression analyses in subsequent tables.
Panel A: Quick Enrollment recipients
(non-participants in the savings plan)
0% contribution rate default
6% contribution rate default
5-yr. age
10-yr. age
5-yr. age
10-yr. age
No peer
No peer
bracket peer
bracket peer
bracket peer
bracket peer
information
information
information
information
information
information
Percent male

69.1

66.0

61.6

77.2

75.4

75.4

Age
Mean
(Std. dev.)

41.0
(13.4)

40.7
(13.4)

41.0
(13.4)

40.4
(11.4)

41.2
(11.6)

41.3
(12.2)

Tenure (years)
Mean
(Std. dev.)

9.4
(12.0)

9.5
(12.1)

9.0
(12.1)

7.2
(9.3)

7.5
(9.5)

7.8
(8.4)

Annual salary ($1000s)
Mean
(Std. dev.)

38.3
(16.7)

38.1
(15.1)

39.0
(18.9)

46.3
(22.3)

46.2
(23.9)

45.1
(21.5)

N = 343

N = 347

N = 349

N = 136

N = 130

N = 134

6

2

7

1

0

0

Sample size
# missing salary data

Panel B: Easy Escalation recipients
(plan participants with initial before-tax contribution rate < min{match threshold, 6%})
0% contribution rate default
6% contribution rate default
5-yr. age
10-yr. age
5-yr. age
10-yr. age
No peer
No peer
bracket peer
bracket peer
bracket peer
bracket peer
information
information
information
information
information
information
Percent male

61.3

51.8

52.0

67.7

67.6

69.5

Age
Mean
(Std. dev.)

39.9
(11.7)

40.8
(11.8)

41.1
(11.9)

41.8
(10.6)

42.0
(10.7)

42.0
(10.5)

Tenure (years)
Mean
(Std. dev.)

11.4
(10.1)

10.6
(9.8)

10.5
(10.6)

10.7
(10.2)

10.5
(9.6)

11.1
(9.9)

Annual salary ($1000s)
Mean
(Std. dev.)

43.8
(16.2)

42.0
(13.3)

41.1
(14.2)

57.4
(30.3)

56.1
(24.8)

58.3
(28.3)

Before-tax contrib. rate
Mean
(Std. dev.)

2.5
(1.8)

2.5
(1.8)

2.6
(1.8)

1.9
(1.7)

1.8
(1.8)

1.8
(1.8)

N = 235

N = 255

N = 256

N = 931

N = 916

N = 911

0

0

0

0

2

3

Sample size
# missing salary data

Table V: Effect of Receiving Peer Information in Quick Enrollment: Mean Comparisons
This table shows the average responses of employees who received Quick Enrollment mailings,
reported separately by contribution rate default and treatment condition, and the differences in
these average responses across treatment conditions. The responses of interest are enrollment in
the savings plan between August 4, 2008 and September 8, 2008 and the before-tax contribution
rate change as a percent of income during the same time period. Quick Enrollment recipients in
the peer information treatments were shown the plan participation rate of employees in their fiveyear or ten-year age bracket. The first two columns display standard errors from tests of
proportions in parentheses, with the standard errors in the last row calculated under the null
hypothesis that the two proportions are equal. The last two columns display standard errors
robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses. *, **, and *** in the last row indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

(1) No peer info
(2) 5-year age bracket info
(3) 10-year age bracket info
(4) Combined 5-year and 10-year
Difference: (4) – (1)

Fraction who enrolled in
savings plan
0% default
6% default
9.9%
0.7%
(1.6)
(0.7)
6.6%
2.3%
(1.3)
(1.3)
6.0%
3.0%
(1.3)
(1.5)
6.3%
2.7%
(0.9)
(1.0)
-3.6%**
1.9%
(1.7)
(1.5)

Average before-tax
contribution rate change
0% default
6% default
0.58%
0.04%
(0.10)
(0.04)
0.40%
0.14%
(0.08)
(0.08)
0.36%
0.16%
(0.08)
(0.08)
0.38%
0.15%
(0.06)
(0.06)
-0.20%*
0.10%
(0.11)
(0.07)

Table VI: Effect of Receiving Peer Information in Quick Enrollment: Regression Analysis
This table reports the results of ordinary least-squares regressions where the dependent variable
is either a dummy for enrolling in the savings plan between August 4, 2008 and September 8,
2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The sample is
Quick Enrollment recipients who have a 0% contribution rate default (columns 1 and 3) or a 6%
contribution rate default (columns 2 and 4). The linear spline in recipient age has knot points at
22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and 67.5. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable:
Enrolled in savings plan
6% default
0% default

Dependent variable:
Before-tax contribution rate change
0% default
6% default

Received peer info
dummy

-0.040**
(0.019)

0.019
(0.014)

-0.221**
(0.112)

0.099
(0.078)

Male dummy

-0.013
(0.020)

-0.031
(0.021)

-0.044
(0.116)

-0.154
(0.113)

log(Tenure)

-0.025***
(0.008)

-0.010
(0.006)

-0.146***
(0.047)

-0.054
(0.035)

log(Salary)

0.007
(0.021)

0.038*
(0.024)

0.021
(0.129)

0.252*
(0.136)

Age spline

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.033

0.048

0.029

0.052

N = 1,024

N = 399

N = 1,024

N = 399

2

R

Sample size

Table VII: Effect of the Peer Information Value Received in Quick Enrollment
This table reports the results of ordinary least-squares regressions where the dependent variable
is either a dummy for enrolling in the savings plan between August 4, 2008 and September 8,
2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The sample is
Quick Enrollment recipients with a 0% contribution rate default (columns 1 and 3) or a 6%
contribution rate default (columns 2 and 4) who were given peer information. The peer
information value was the plan participation rate of coworkers in the recipient’s five-year or tenyear age bracket. The linear spline in recipient age has knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and
67.5. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Dependent variable:
Enrolled in savings plan
0% default
6% default

Dependent variable:
Before-tax contribution rate change
0% default
6% default

Peer info value

-1.760**
(0.731)

1.083*
(0.559)

-10.663**
(4.613)

5.558*
(2.935)

Male dummy

0.011
(0.022)

-0.057*
(0.031)

0.088
(0.134)

-0.293*
(0.166)

log(Tenure)

-0.010
(0.009)

-0.016**
(0.008)

-0.061
(0.053)

-0.087**
(0.044)

log(Salary)

-0.022
(0.027)

0.062*
(0.034)

-0.138
(0.170)

0.398**
(0.199)

Age spline

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.034

0.085

0.033

0.091

N = 687

N = 264

N = 687

N = 264

R2
Sample size

Table VIII: Effect of the Peer Information Value Received in Quick Enrollment:
Sources of Identification
This table reports the peer information value coefficients from ordinary least-squares regressions
analyzing employee responses to Quick Enrollment mailings. The coefficients in each cell come
from separate regressions. The sample is recipients of Quick Enrollment mailings that included a
peer information value equal to the savings plan participation rate of coworkers in either the
recipient’s five-year or ten-year age bracket. Depending on the row, the sample is further
restricted to employees with a 0% contribution rate default or a 6% contribution rate default. The
dependent variable is either a dummy for enrolling in the savings plan between August 4, 2008
and September 8, 2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period.
The column headings indicate the source of variation used to identify the peer information value
coefficient. All regressions include controls for gender, log tenure, log salary, and a constant, as
in Table VII, as well as a linear spline in recipient age with knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …,
and 67.5. Additional controls for age are included as indicated in the bottom rows. Standard
errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source of identification for the effect
of the peer information value
Baseline
Differences in 5-year
Discontinuities
(from Table
vs. 10-year peer
around age
VII)
information values
bracket boundaries
Dependent variable:
Enrolled in savings plan
0% contribution rate default (N = 687)
6% contribution rate default (N = 264)
Dependent variable:
Before-tax contribution rate change
0% contribution rate default (N = 687)
6% contribution rate default (N = 264)
Age controls
Age spline
5-yr. age group dummies
Rec’d 10-year age group info dummy
Age spline × rec’d 10-year age group info

-1.760**
(0.731)

-1.970**
(0.816)

-0.736
(1.224)

1.083*
(0.559)

1.490*
(0.881)

0.994
(1.025)

-10.663**
(4.613)

-11.784**
(5.073)

-5.237
(7.611)

5.558*
(2.935)

9.038*
(5.261)

3.180
(3.860)

Yes
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
No
No

Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Table IX: Effect of the Peer Information Value Received in Quick Enrollment:
Robustness to Different Age Controls
This table reports the peer information value coefficients from ordinary least-squares regressions
analyzing employee responses to Quick Enrollment mailings. The estimated coefficients in each
cell come from separate regressions. The sample is recipients of Quick Enrollment mailings that
included a peer information value equal to the savings plan participation rate of coworkers in
either the recipient’s five-year or ten-year age bracket. The sample is further restricted to those
with a 0% contribution rate default (columns 1 and 3) or a 6% contribution rate default (columns
2 and 4). The dependent variable is either a dummy for enrolling in the plan between August 4,
2008 and September 8, 2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time
period. All regressions include controls for gender, log tenure, log salary, and a constant, as in
Table VII. The regressions vary in how they control for recipient age: (1) a linear spline in age
with knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and 67.5 (every five years), which is the baseline; (2) a
linear spline in age with knot points at 22.5, 25, 27.5, …, and 67.5 (every 2.5 years); (3) a linear
spline in age with knot points every 5 years and dummies for the target date retirement fund
offered, which is dependent on age; (4) a linear spline in age with knot points every five years
and controls for the number of years the recipient is from the age group mean (linear and squared
terms); or (5) a linear spline in age with knot points every five years and controls for the
recipient’s percentile rank in the age group (linear and squared terms). Standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Parameterization of age controls
Age spline with knot points every 5
years (Baseline from Table VII)

Dependent variable:
Enrolled in savings plan
0% default
6% default
-1.760**
1.083*
(0.731)
(0.559)

Dependent variable:
Before-tax contribution
rate change
0% default
6% default
-10.663**
5.558*
(4.613)
(2.935)

Age spline with knot points every
2.5 years

-1.736**
(0.734)

1.342**
(0.662)

-10.520**
(4.636)

6.760**
(3.285)

Dummies for target date retirement
fund offered

-1.931***
(0.723)

0.990*
(0.574)

-11.665**
(4.558)

5.797*
(3.396)

Controls for years from age group
mean (linear and squared)

-2.041**
(0.797)

0.890
(0.596)

-12.220**
(4.994)

5.111
(3.517)

Controls for percentile within age
group (linear and squared)

-1.757**
(0.748)

1.180*
(0.657)

-10.438**
(4.673)

6.519*
(3.798)

Sample size

N = 687

N = 264

N = 687

N = 264

Table X: Effect of Receiving Peer Information in Easy Escalation: Mean Comparisons
This table shows the average responses of employees who received Easy Escalation mailings,
reported separately by contribution rate default and treatment condition, and the differences in
these average responses across treatment conditions. The responses of interest are increasing
one’s before-tax contribution rate between August 4, 2008 and September 8, 2008 and the
before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. Easy Escalation recipients in
the peer information treatments were shown the fraction of plan participants in their five-year or
ten-year age bracket with before-tax contribution rates of at least 6%. The first two columns
display standard errors from tests of proportions in parentheses, with the standard errors in the
last row calculated under the null hypothesis that the two proportions are equal. The last two
columns display standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses. *, **, and *** in the
last row indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

(1) No peer info
(2) 5-year age bracket info
(3) 10-year age bracket info
(4) Combined 5-year and 10-year
Difference: (4) – (1)

Fraction who increased
before-tax contribution rate
0% default
6% default
10.6%
8.2%
(2.0)
(0.9)
9.8%
7.8%
(1.9)
(0.9)
11.3%
8.8%
(2.0)
(0.9)
10.6%
8.3%
(1.4)
(0.6)
-0.1%
0.1%
(2.4)
(1.1)

Average before-tax
contribution rate change
0% default
6% default
0.33%
0.26%
(0.08)
(0.04)
0.30%
0.29%
(0.07)
(0.05)
0.38%
0.40%
(0.09)
(0.07)
0.34%
0.35%
(0.06)
(0.05)
0.01%
0.08%
(0.10)
(0.06)

Table XI: Effect of Receiving Peer Information in Easy Escalation: Regression Analysis
This table reports the results of ordinary least-squares regressions where the dependent variable
is either a dummy for increasing one’s before-tax contribution rate between August 4, 2008 and
September 8, 2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The
sample is Easy Escalation recipients with a 0% contribution rate default (columns 1 and 3) or a
6% contribution rate default (columns 2 and 4). The linear spline in age has knot points at 22.5,
27.5, 32.5, …, and 67.5. Before-tax contribution rates as of July 14, 2008 are controlled for using
a full set of contribution rate dummies. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors robust
to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Received peer
info dummy

Dependent variable:
Increased before-tax contribution rate
0% default
6% default
-0.004
0.001
(0.025)
(0.011)

Dependent variable:
Before-tax contribution rate change
0% default
6% default
-0.008
0.072
(0.101)
(0.057)

Male dummy

-0.052**
(0.026)

0.002
(0.011)

-0.147
(0.105)

0.024
(0.047)

log(Tenure)

-0.003
(0.014)

0.002
(0.005)

-0.047
(0.056)

0.030
(0.023)

log(Salary)

0.064*
(0.038)

0.056***
(0.014)

0.308**
(0.147)

0.406***
(0.115)

Age spline

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Contribution rate
dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.029

0.024

0.041

0.018

N = 746

N = 2,753

N = 746

N = 2,753

R2
Sample size

Table XII: Effect of the Peer Information Value Received in Easy Escalation
This table reports the results of ordinary least-squares regressions where the dependent variable
is either a dummy for increasing one’s before-tax contribution rate between August 4, 2008 and
September 8, 2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The
sample is Easy Escalation recipients who were given peer information and have a 0%
contribution rate default (columns 1 and 3) or a 6% contribution rate default (columns 2 and 4).
The peer information value was the fraction of savings plan participants in the recipient’s fiveyear or ten-year age bracket with before-tax contribution rates of at least 6%. The linear spline in
age has knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and 67.5. Before-tax contribution rates as of July 14,
2008 are controlled for using a full set of contribution rate dummies. All regressions include a
constant. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable:
Increased before-tax contribution rate
0% default
6% default

Dependent variable:
Before-tax contribution rate change
0% default
6% default

Peer info value

2.309
(1.901)

0.494
(0.813)

11.108
(7.085)

7.414*
(4.179)

Male dummy

-0.035
(0.031)

-0.002
(0.014)

-0.050
(0.124)

0.014
(0.062)

log(Tenure)

0.000
(0.017)

-0.002
(0.006)

-0.063
(0.069)

0.019
(0.032)

log(Salary)

0.069
(0.055)

0.056***
(0.017)

0.371*
(0.215)

0.487***
(0.166)

Age spline

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Contribution rate
dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.041

0.020

0.064

0.021

N = 511

N = 1,822

N = 511

N = 1,822

R2
Sample size

Table XIII: Effect of Receiving Peer Information in Quick Enrollment Among Employees
with a 0% Contribution Default: Interaction with Relative Salary Within Firm and State
This table reports the results of ordinary least-squares regressions where the dependent variable
is either a dummy for enrolling in the savings plan between August 4, 2008 and September 8,
2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The sample in the
left two columns is Quick Enrollment recipients who have a 0% contribution rate default. In the
right two columns, this sample is further restricted to employees who received peer information.
“Salary below median in firm and state” is a dummy for having a salary below the median salary
among all active employees at the firm in the same state, including those not in the experiment.
“Peer info value” is the plan participation rate of coworkers in the recipient’s five-year or tenyear age bracket. The linear spline in recipient age has knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and
67.5. In the right two columns, all components of the age spline are also interacted with the
salary below median dummy. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Contribution
Enrolled
Contribution
Enrolled
rate change
in plan
rate change
in plan
Received peer info
0.007
0.042
dummy
(0.018)
(0.105)
Salary below
median in firm and
state × peer info

-0.052*
(0.028)

-0.291*
(0.167)

Peer info value
Salary below
median in firm and
state × peer value
Salary below
median in firm and
state

0.984
(0.847)

5.988
(5.112)

-2.844**
(1.126)

-17.254**
(7.025)

0.079***
(0.022)

0.457***
(0.132)

3.923**
(1.642)

20.611**
(9.140)

Male dummy

-0.011
(0.020)

-0.035
(0.118)

0.014
(0.023)

0.108
(0.139)

log(Tenure)

-0.024***
(0.008)

-0.142***
(0.047)

-0.009
(0.009)

-0.055
(0.054)

log(Salary)

0.021
(0.023)

0.100
(0.137)

-0.017
(0.029)

-0.108
(0.178)

Age spline

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Salary below med.
× age spline

No

No

Yes

Yes

0.035

0.031

0.041

0.040

N = 1,024

N = 1,024

N = 687

N = 687

R2
Sample size

Table XIV: Effect of Receiving Peer Information in Quick Enrollment Among Employees
with a 0% Contribution Default: Interaction with Salary Relative to Firm-Wide Median
This table reports the results of ordinary least-squares regressions where the dependent variable
is either a dummy for enrolling in the savings plan between August 4, 2008 and September 8,
2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The sample in the
left two columns is Quick Enrollment recipients who have a 0% contribution rate default. In the
right two columns, this sample is further restricted to employees who received peer information.
“Salary below firm median” is a dummy for having a salary below the median salary among all
active employees in the firm, including those not in the experiment. “Peer info value” is the plan
participation rate of coworkers in the recipient’s five-year or ten-year age bracket. The linear
spline in recipient age has knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and 67.5. In the right two columns,
all components of the age spline are also interacted with the salary below firm median dummy.
All regressions include a constant. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.

Received peer info
dummy

Enrolled
in plan
-0.025
(0.032)

Contribution
rate change
-0.149
(0.192)

Enrolled
in plan

Contribution
rate change

Salary below firm
median × peer info

-0.019
(0.039)

-0.089
(0.230)

Peer info value

-2.189
(1.989)

-13.142
(11.911)

Salary below firm
median × peer value

0.458
(2.129)

2.647
(12.823)

Salary below firm
median

0.051
(0.039)

0.281
(0.232)

0.654
(1.914)

0.776
(10.943)

Male dummy

-0.013
(0.020)

-0.045
(0.117)

0.013
(0.022)

0.100
(0.137)

log(Tenure)

-0.024***
(0.008)

-0.144***
(0.047)

-0.009
(0.009)

-0.054
(0.054)

log(Salary)

0.028
(0.025)

0.141
(0.153)

-0.010
(0.033)

-0.069
(0.206)

Age spline

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Salary below firm
med. × age spline

No

No

Yes

Yes

0.034

0.030

0.043

0.042

N = 1,024

N = 1,024

N = 687

N = 687

R2
Sample size

Table XV: Effect of Receiving Peer Information in Easy Escalation:
Interaction with Before-Tax Contribution Rate Prior to the Experiment
This table reports the results of ordinary least-squares regressions where the dependent variable
is either a dummy for increasing one’s before-tax contribution rate between August 4, 2008 and
September 8, 2008 or the before-tax contribution rate change during the same time period. The
sample is Easy Escalation recipients with a 0% contribution rate default (columns 1 and 3) or a
6% contribution rate default (columns 2 and 4). Before-tax contribution rates as of July 14, 2008
are controlled for using a full set of contribution rate dummies. The regressions also include the
interaction between the dummy for receiving peer information and a dummy for having a beforetax contribution rate of 0%, 1%, or 2% (as opposed to 3%, 4%, or 5%). The linear spline in age
has knot points at 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, …, and 67.5. All regressions include a constant. Standard
errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Received peer
info dummy

Dependent variable:
Increased before-tax contribution rate
0% default
6% default
0.038
-0.019
(0.034)
(0.021)

Dependent variable:
Before-tax contribution rate change
0% default
6% default
0.175*
-0.041
(0.090)
(0.063)

Cont. rate 0% to
2% × peer info

-0.087*
(0.049)

0.032
(0.024)

-0.378*
(0.200)

0.184*
(0.107)

Male dummy

-0.052**
(0.026)

0.002
(0.011)

-0.147
(0.105)

0.024
(0.047)

log(Tenure)

-0.003
(0.014)

0.001
(0.005)

-0.048
(0.057)

0.029
(0.023)

log(Salary)

0.059
(0.038)

0.056***
(0.014)

0.286*
(0.147)

0.406***
(0.115)

Age spline

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Contribution rate
dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.033

0.025

0.045

0.018

N = 746

N = 2,753

N = 746

N = 2,753

R2
Sample size

